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BATTLE OF THE BAND: EXPLORING
THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF
SECTION 2(A) OF THE LANHAM ACT
AND THE FATE OF DISPARAGING,
SCANDALOUS, AND IMMORAL
TRADEMARKS IN A CONSUMERDRIVEN MARKET
Tanya Behnam*
In the 2016-2017 term, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Matal v. Tam, holding that the Lanham Act’s section 2(a) ban on
disparaging trademarks—which prevents registration of any trademarks
that the PTO deems to be disparaging to any groups or institutions—is
unconstitutional. Although meant to only apply to section 2(a)’s ban on
disparaging trademarks, the Court’s decision increases the likelihood
that section 2(a)’s still-standing ban on scandalous and immoral marks
are unconstitutional as well.
This Comment first reviews the basic principles of trademark law
and the Lanham Act, summarizes Simon Tam’s legal battles, and briefly
presents the conflicting case of Pro-Football v. Blackhorse. This
Comment explores the failings of section 2(a)’s bans, its suppression of
free speech, and its divergence from the goals of federal trademark law.
Finally, this Comment analyzes Matal’s applicability to scandalous and
immoral marks and Matal’s impact on future trademark registration in a
consumer-driven marketplace.


* J.D. Candidate at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 2018. The author would like to
thank Professor Aimee Dudovitz and the Editorial Board of the Entertainment Law Review of
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles for their assistance in publishing this article. The author would
also like to give a special thank you to her parents, Imra and Behzad Behnam, for their lifelong
and unwavering support.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2013, international singer Justin Bieber received a public
rebuking when, following his visit to the Anne Frank Museum in
Amsterdam, he remarked that Holocaust victim Anne Frank
“[h]opefully . . . would have been a Belieber.”1 Recently, celebrity
designer Marc Jacobs drew heavy criticism for allegedly exhibiting
cultural appropriation after dressing his Caucasian runway models in
dreadlock wigs during New York Fashion Week. 2 And former
American Idol runner-up Bo Bice angrily took to the media after a fast
food chain employee “referred to him as ‘that white boy’ as he waited
for his order.”3 These incidents reflect our increasing sensitivity to
words, images, and actions we consider offensive or insulting. 4 People
are frequently and easily offended, now more than ever before.
Technological advances have connected the world, resulting in
worldwide exposure and societal retribution for even isolated off-color
remarks that, years ago, would likely have been brushed off.5 This
heightened sensitivity even manifests itself on a government level: The
United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has recently
cancelled or refused registration to multiple trademarks for being too
disparaging.6

1. See Alan Duke, Justin Bieber Hopes Anne Frank ‘Would Have Been a Belieber’, CNN
(Apr. 26, 2013, 2:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/14/showbiz/bieber-anne-frank/ [https://
perma.cc/JG5Z-G7RD].
2. Valeria Safronva, Marc Jacobs’s Use of Faux Locks on Models Draws Social Media
Ire, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/18/fashion/marc-jacobsmodels-dreadlocks-social-media-response-new-york-fashion-week.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/
347V-6C Z5].
3. Michele Amabile Angermiller, ‘American Idol’ Alum Bo Bice Takes Aim at Popeyes
Over Being Called ‘White Boy’, BILLBOARD (Jan. 4, 2017), http://www.billboard.com/articles/
news/7647005/american-idol-bo-bice-popeyes [https://perma.cc/AGB5-DP8J].
4. See Eleanor Halls, Millennials. Stop Being Offended By, Like, Literally Everything, GQ
(Aug. 12, 2016), http://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/article/millennials-created-generation-snowflake
[https://perma.cc/9TWT-EDXD].
5. Bradley Campbell & Jason Manning, The New Millennial ‘Morality’: Highly Sensitive
and Easily Offended, TIME (Nov. 17, 2015), http://time.com/4115439/student-protests-micro
aggressions/ [https://perma.cc/PP2R-AZ6Y]; Halls, supra note 4.
6. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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In this age of political correctness, however, some social groups
insist on pushing the limits on what is socially acceptable by using and
glorifying the words, images, and actions that others find distressing. 7
By challenging stereotypes, these groups encourage dialogue about
gender, race, religion, and other emotionally charged topics. 8 One way
groups challenge negative stereotypes is by “reclaiming” an offensive
word or term.9 To do so, a “derogatory sign or signifier is consciously
employed by the ‘original’ target of the derogation, often in a positive
or oppositional sense.”10 For instance, when the African American
community reclaims the word “nigger,” and women reclaim the word
“cunt,” they engage in value reversal, replacing the “negative
connotative value” of the terms “with a positive one.”11
During the United States Supreme Court’s 2016–2017 Term, a
controversial example of this unique crossroads—wherein efforts are
made to both avoid and confront offensive speech—appeared on the
national stage.12 On June 19, 2017, the Supreme Court issued its
opinion in Matal v. Tam (“Matal”), a case centered around one band’s
efforts to publicly reclaim an offensive term. 13 Matal, previously
7. See Anita Henderson, What’s in a Slur?, 78 AM. SPEECH 52, 65 (2003); Robin
Brontsema, A Queer Revolution: Reconceptualizing the Debate Over Linguistic Reclamation, 17
COLO. RES. IN L INGUISTICS 1, 9 (2004).
8. See generally Brooke Barnett & Randy Williams, Leading Conversations About
Racism on Predominantly White Campuses, INSIGHT INTO D IVERSITY, http://www.insightinto
diversity. com/leading-conversations-about-racism-on-predominantly-white-campuses/
[https://perma.cc/U7T3-M83C]; Jessica Bennett, How to Fight Back Against Sexism at Work,
COSMOPOLITAN (Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.cosmopolitan.com/career/a61855/fight-backsexism-workplace/ [https://perma.cc/JJ9C-VWVE]; Chiara A. Sottile, Dakota Access Pipeline
Fight Watched on Facebook Live around World, NBC NEWS (Nov. 5, 2016, 7:06 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/dakota-pipeline-protests/dakota-access-pipeline-fightwatched-facebook-live-around-world-n67836 [https://perma.cc/D78K-Q7UY]; Women Fight
Back Against Sexist GOP Outside Trump Tower, TELESUR (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.telesurtv
.net/english/news/Women-Fight-Back-Against-Sexist-GOP-Outside-Trump-Tower-201610120015.html [https://perma.cc/9WMW-SNHE].
9. Brontsema, supra note 7, at 1.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 9; Henderson, supra note 7, at 65.
12. See Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016), cert. granted, (No. 174, 2016 Term)
13. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1744 (2017).
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identified as Lee v. Tam and In re Tam, documents the journey of The
Slants, a band that endeavored to reclaim the derogatory term “slant.” 14
Despite the musical group’s growing popularity, the PTO deemed the
band’s name disparaging to Asian Americans and repeatedly denied
trademark protection to its lead singer Simon Tam. 15 In In re Tam, the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals struck down as unconstitutional the
Lanham Act’s ban on disparaging trademarks. 16 This decision went
head-to-head with Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse—then on appeal in
the Fourth Circuit—in which a district court upheld the constitutionality
of the Lanham Act’s section 2(a).17 Then, in its June decision, the
Supreme Court affirmed In re Tam,18 a holding that greatly impacts the
future of trademark registration and regulation within the United
States.19
The Matal Court’s determination that section 2(a)’s disparagement
clause is unconstitutional—because trademarks are private speech—was
correct. Moving forward, this same holding should also be applied to
section 2(a)’s ban on immoral and scandalous marks. Extending
Matal’s holding to immoral and scandalous marks is essential to
upholding the First Amendment’s freedoms. Moreover, fears that Matal
will lead to a flood of federal registration of disparaging, immoral, and
scandalous marks are groundless, as an overwhelming portion of the
market will likely reject the use of such trademarks.
This comment focuses on the Lanham Act’s ban on disparaging,
immoral, and scandalous trademarks. Specifically, this comment
explores the vague nature of section 2(a)’s bans, its suppression of free
speech, and its divergence from federal trademark law’s goals. Part II
14. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1331.
15. In re Tam, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d 1305, at *1313 (T.T.A.B. 2013).
16. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1358.
17. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 489 (E.D. Va. 2015); Brief for
Pro-Football, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2-3, Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30
(2016) (No. 15-1293).
18. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1747.
19. Joanna Diakos & Thomas W. Dollar, Trademark Law Update: SCOTUS to Decide
Whether Ban on Registering ‘Disparaging Marks’ Is Unconstitutional, NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 8,
2016),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/trademark-law-update-scotus-to-decide-whetherban-registering-disparaging-marks [https://perma.cc/MU69-3ERY].
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discusses trademark law, including its purpose and significance. Part III
examines Matal v. Tam, its procedural history, and The Slants’ journey
to achieving trademark registration. Finally, Part IV analyzes the
failings of section 2(a), Matal’s applicability to scandalous and immoral
marks, and Matal’s impact on future trademark registration.
II. THE TRADEMARK REGISTRATION PROCESS
A. What is a Trademark?
In 1946, Congress enacted the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1051),
also known as the Trademark Act of 1946. 20 Established under the
power of the Commerce Clause, the Lanham Act “provides for a
national system of trademark registration and protects the owner of a
federally registered mark against the use of similar marks if such use is
likely to result in consumer confusion, or if the dilution of a famous
mark is likely to occur.”21
Under the Lanham Act, a trademark is defined “as including ‘any
word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof’ used by any
person ‘to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the
goods.’”22 To obtain registration, a markholder must pay a fee to the
PTO, verify that the mark in question is used in commerce, 23 and assert
that no other person has the right to use the mark. 24
20. .Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1752 (2017); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,
505 U.S. 763, 763 (1992).
21. Lanham Act, CORNELL UNIV. L AW SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.
cornell.edu/wex/lanham_act [https://perma.cc/WYV5-PSKZ].
22. Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 764. For instance, international fast-food chain
McDonalds has registered trademarks for its distinctive golden arches (logo), its slogans (“I’m
Lovin’ it”), its name, and even the prefix “Mc.” The PTO has deemed these words, symbols, and
phrases to identify McDonalds and only McDonalds. See Logos, MCDONALD’S, http://corporate.
mcdonalds.com/content/mcd/newsroom/image_and_video_library/logos.html [https://perma.cc/
CHJ8-RS5J].
23. Applicants may also file under an “Intent to Use” (ITU) application. Under such an
application, the trademark need not be in commercial use at the time of filing; it need only be
used in commerce within a certain time period following application to achieve registration dating
back to the application date. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(b) (2017); see 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2017).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1051.
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B. The Purpose of Trademark Law
Trademark registration protects both the public and the
markholder. 25 For a trademark to receive protection, the mark must be
source identifying—it must inform consumers of the source of goods or
services. 26 Protecting a registered mark and prohibiting all others from
using it safeguards consumers against mistakenly purchasing counterfeit
products.27 It also protects the markholder from misappropriation of his
or her investment by giving the markholder the power to prevent others
from using it. 28 This keeps potential infringers from “reap[ing] where
[they have] not sown,” and allows the markholder to fully enjoy the
fruits of his or her labor.29 In other words, trademark law “make[s]
infringement and piracy unprofitable.” 30
C. Why Register a Trademark?
Trademark registration with the PTO is not a prerequisite to
bringing a trademark-infringement claim. 31 Source-identifying marks
used in commerce are generally protected under the common law and
state legislation. 32 Registering a mark with the PTO, however, affords
markholders crucial benefits not available at common law. 33 These
25. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946).
26. P. Sean Morris, The Economics of Distinctiveness: The Road to Monopolization in
Trade Mark Law, 33 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 321, 323 (2011); William T. Vuk, Note,
Protecting Baywatch and Wagamama: Why the European Union Should Revise the 1989
Trademark Directive to Mandate Dilution Protection for Trademarks, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
861, 861 (1998).
27. Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 1980).
28. Vuk, supra note 26, at 867–68.
29. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239–40 (1918).
30. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3
31. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
32. Id. (“The markholder may still generally use the mark as it wishes; without federal
registration, it simply lacks access to certain federal statutory enforcement mechanisms for
excluding others from confusingly similar uses of the mark”).
33. Should I Register My Trademark?, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/basics/register.jsp [https://perma.cc/7QJY-ULLF].
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benefits, created by the Lanham Act, include addition of the mark to the
principal register, legal presumption of ownership of the mark,
constructive notice to the public of a markholder’s ownership of the
mark, the right to display the registered trademark symbol (®) alongside
the mark, permission to bring an action regarding the mark in federal
court, the ability to collect profits or damages in an infringement suit,
basis for registering the mark in foreign nations, and the right to have
United States Customs and Border Protection prevent other entities
from importing infringing goods bearing a registrant’s marks. 34 In other
words, although a trademark not protected by the PTO may still be a
defensible mark, it lacks many of the crucial advantages that the
Lanham Act affords. Today, over “two million marks . . . have active
federal certificates of registration.” 35
D. Bars to Trademark Registration
Before the PTO approves a mark for federal registration, the mark
must clear several hurdles, outlined in section 2 of the Lanham Act. 36
For instance, trademarks bearing a flag or insignia of the United States
or any other state or nation cannot be registered. 37 Likewise,
trademarks consisting of the name, signature or portrait of a living
person cannot be registered without that person’s consent. 38 Finally, the
Lanham Act prohibits registration of trademarks that are merely
descriptive, deceptively mis-descriptive, primarily geographically
descriptive, primarily surnames, functional, or that consumers may
confuse with other registered marks. 39

34. Id.; Michael Baroni, Warning: Offensive Trademarks Lie Ahead, O.C. LAWYER ,
http://www.virtualonlineeditions.com/article/Warning%3A+Offensive+Trademarks+Lie+Ahead/
2499689/0/article.html [https://perma.cc/JR33-Q879].
35. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1752.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2017).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(b).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c) (2017). Additionally, if the trademark is of the name, signature,
or portrait of a deceased United States President, the markholder cannot register the mark without
written consent of the deceased President’s widow. Id.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d)–(e) (2017).
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Section 2(a) presents additional registration obstacles. It provides
that trademarks comprising or consisting of “immoral, deceptive, or
scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a
connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national
symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute” shall be refused
trademark registration. 40 A disparaging mark is one that “‘dishonor[s]
by comparison with what is inferior, slight[s], deprecate[s], degrade[s],
or affect[s] or injure[s] by unjust comparison.’” 41 For example, the
PTO has, in the past, denied trademarks for phrases like JIHADI
KILLER and QUEER GEAR because it deemed them disparaging to
Muslims and the LGBT community, respectively. 42
To determine whether a registrant’s mark is disparaging, the
PTO’s trademark examiners used the following test: “(1) What is the
likely meaning of the matter in question, . . . and (2) if that meaning is
found to refer to identifiable persons, institutions, beliefs or national
symbols, whether that meaning may be disparaging to a substantial
composite of the referenced group.” 43 The Lanham Act banned
disparaging marks because the government purportedly “disapproves of
the messages” these types of trademarks convey.”44
Similarly, courts use a fact-based approach to determine whether a
mark comprises scandalous or immoral matter. 45 To prove that a mark
is scandalous,
the PTO must demonstrate that the mark is “shocking to the sense
of truth, decency, or propriety; disgraceful; offensive; disreputable;

40. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2017).
41. In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
42. Baroni, supra note 34; Fred Barbash, Warning: This article on Trademarks May
Include Language Deemed ‘Scandalous, Immoral or Disparaging’, WASH. POST (Sept. 30,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/09/30/the-idiotic-historyof-deeming-trademarks-scandalous-immoral-or-disparaging/?utm_term=.ea5479bc9c31
[https://perma.cc/WA8E-VF4N].
43. Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
§ 1203.03(b)(i), https://www.uspto.gov/trademark/guides-and-manuals/tmep-archives (click on
“January 2015” under “TMEP—Archived Editions”) [https://perma.cc/2NBD-W8XB].
44. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1327.
45. In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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. . . giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings; . . . [or]
calling out [for] condemnation.” The PTO must consider the mark
in the context of the marketplace as applied to only the goods
described in [the] application for registration.46

As with disparaging marks, “[w]hether or not the mark, including
innuendo, is scandalous is to be ascertained from the standpoint of not
necessarily a majority, but a substantial composite of the general
public.”47
III. ONE BAND’S JOURNEY TO THE TOP CHARTS AND HIGHEST COURTS
A. The Slants: Rock n’ Roll with Purpose
The Slants, who self-identify as “the first and only all-Asian
American dance rock band,” have been at the center of this trademark
registration controversy for years.48 During this time, The Slants have
built a reputation not only as musicians, but also as advocates for their
fellow Asian-Americans. 49 Most notably, the band has made efforts to
confront Asian-American stereotypes head-on. The band’s mere
existence challenges the stereotype that Asian-American musicians are
best suited to classical music and instruments. 50 To date, The Slants
have released two albums with racially charged titles (“Slanted Eyes,
Slanted Hearts” and “The Yellow Album”) using terms typically used to

46. Id.
47. In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 485 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
48. Michelle Chen, Simon Tam on Activism, Freedom of Speech, and Strange Allies,
HYPHEN
(Sept. 15, 2017), https://hyphenmagazine.com/blog/2017/09/simon-tam-activismfreedom-speech-and-strange-allies [https://perma.cc/JZJ2-86P8].
49. See April Baer, The Slants: Trading in Stereotypes, NPR (June 11, 2008, 1:22 PM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90278746 [https://perma.cc/4FE4-L5KE];
Katy Steinmetz, “The Slants” Suit: Asian-American Band Goes to Court over Name, TIME
(Oct. 23, 2013), http://entertainment.time.com/2013/10/23/the-slants-suit-asian-american-bandgoes-to-court-over-name/ [https://perma.cc/ZLY9-DHQR].
50. Lisa Bernier, 11 Asian Musicians Proving that Great Music Knows No Race, MIC
(Mar. 12, 2014), https://mic.com/articles/85035/11-asian-musicians-proving-that-great-musicknows-no-race#.AuPLgmM1Z [https://perma.cc/3FKV-P2FX].
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describe stereotypical Asian features and skin-tone. 51 The band’s name
itself is a direct reference to the musicians’ Asian-American heritage.
Band-founder Simon Tam has explained that the meaning behind the
band’s name is trifold; it alludes to the band members’ “slant on life,” it
refers to the slanted guitar chords used in their music, and, most
importantly, it confronts a derogatory slang term directed toward
Asians. 52
Use of the word “slant” as a derogatory term toward AsianAmericans has been recorded as early as 1943.53 It was this derogatory
usage of the term that led the PTO to deny trademark registration to the
band in December 2012 on the grounds that it was disparaging to
persons of Asian descent at the time of registration. 54
B. Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Finds Section 2(a)
Constitutional
Following the PTO’s initial denial of trademark for THE
SLANTS, Tam appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(TTAB).55 In its appeal, Tam clarified the band’s purpose in using the
term “slant” as a commentary on Asian-American stereotypes and
further questioned section 2(a)’s ban on disparaging marks. 56 In 2013,
the TTAB upheld the PTO’s refusal to register THE SLANTS.57 In its
opinion, the TTAB held that despite Tam’s intent to reclaim the term
“slant,” the meaning was nonetheless “a highly disparaging reference to
people of Asian descent.”58 Furthermore, the board held that section
2(a) of the Lanham Act was immune from First Amendment strict
51. Discography, THE SLANTS, http://www.theslants.com/discography/ [https://perma.cc/
K84L-ZAFW].
52. In re Tam, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d 1305, at *1305 (T.T.A.B. 2013); Steinmetz, supra note 49.
53. Slant, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/slant?s=t [https://perma.
cc/HK7B-W9V2].
54. In re Tam, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d at *1305.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1307.
58. Id.
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scrutiny because Tam could still use the band name in commerce. 59 In
other words, because Tam was not forbidden from using “The Slants”
as his band name, speech was not so restricted for section 2(a) to
undergo strict scrutiny evaluation. 60
C. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Overturns the TTAB
Tam appealed the TTAB’s decision to the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals.61 At first, the court affirmed the TTAB’s decision, finding
evidence that THE SLANTS is “likely offensive to a substantial
composite of people of Asian descent.” 62 Then, in late 2015, the court,
sitting en banc, reversed the TTAB’s holding and remanded the case to
the board for further proceedings. 63 In its decision, the court held that
the Lanham Act is not immune to First Amendment strict scrutiny, and
that registration under the Lanham Act does not qualify as government
speech and cannot be considered a government subsidy. 64 This
decision, which focused solely on the disparaging-marks segment of
section 2(a), effectively deemed the disparagement proscription
unconstitutional. 65
According to the court, section 2(a)’s ban on disparaging marks is
antithetical to the policy behind the Lanham Act—the ban fails to
prevent consumer confusion or deceit, and it does not protect certain

59. Id. at 1313.
60. Id. at 1309. Strict scrutiny evaluation is the strictest standard of review employed in
cases alleging a constitutional violation. Among other questions, strict scrutiny analysis asks
whether the government interest is compelling, and, if so, whether the law is narrowly tailored
enough to achieve that government interest. See Roy G. Space & David Yokum, Scrutinizing
Strict Scrutiny, 40 VT. L. REV. 285, 293–98 (2015). As compared to its counterparts—
intermediate scrutiny and rational basis scrutiny—strict scrutiny is the hardest to survive. The
TTAB’s designation of section 2(a) as not deserving strict scrutiny, therefore, made it more likely
that the statute would be found constitutional.
61. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
62. In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 571 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
63. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1328.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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markholders’ investment in their marks. 66 Rather, the ban denies “the
protections of registration for reasons quite separate from any ability of
the mark to serve the consumer and investment interests underlying
trademark protection.”67
In striking down section 2(a) as unconstitutional, the court first
determined that the disparagement clause discriminates on the basis of
both content and viewpoint.68 Specifically, it held that section 2(a)
discriminates on the basis of content in the sense that it “‘applies to
particular speech because of the topic discussed.’” 69 It further held that
when “[t]he PTO rejects marks under section 2(a) when it finds the
marks refer to a group in a negative way, but . . . permits the registration
of marks that refer to a group in a positive, non-disparaging manner[,]
[s]ection 2(a) . . . discriminates on the basis of viewpoint.” 70 Because it
involves content and viewpoint discrimination, the court explained,
section 2(a) is subject to strict scrutiny. 71 And as a restriction that
denies trademark registration solely based on the disparaging message
that a mark is perceived to convey, the court concluded that section 2(a)
fails strict scrutiny analysis. 72
The court underscored its conclusion by observing section 2(a)’s
financial effect on markholders. 73 “[T]he Government offends the First
Amendment when it imposes financial burdens on certain speakers
based on the content of their expression.” 74 Federally registering a
66. Id. at 1329–30.
67. Id. at 1329.
68. Id. at 1335.
69. Id. (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015)).
70. Id. at 1336.
71. Id. at 1334, 1337 (explaining that “[s]trict scrutiny is used to review any governmental
regulation that burdens private speech based on disapproval of the message conveyed,” and
holding that strict scrutiny applies to and invalidates “[c]ontent-based laws—those that target
speech based on its communicative content.”).
72. Id. at 1337.
73. Id. at 1340–41.
74. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995).
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trademark provides a markholder with a valuable “asset”75 that confers
significant financial benefits. 76 By preventing markholders from
federally registering marks that are determined to be disparaging,
section 2(a) effectively “burdens some speakers and benefits others.” 77
The court rejected the government’s argument that strict scrutiny
does not apply because trademark registration qualifies as government
speech. 78 Rather, the court held that by registering a trademark, the
PTO is regulating private speech. 79
When the Government registers a trademark, the only message it
conveys is that a mark is registered. The vast array of private
trademarks are not created . . . , owned[,] . . . monopolized . . . , [or]
sized and formatted by the Government, . . . understood as
performing any Government function . . . , aligned with the
Government, or . . . used as a platform for Government speech.80

According to the court, consumers do not equate federal
registration of a mark with government approval of that mark,81 and the
PTO itself clarified that the office “does not endorse any particular
product, service, mark, or registrant” when it approves a mark for
federal registration.82 Instead, the court equated trademark registration
with more mundane government authorizations such as street parade

75. Id. at 1340.
76. Lee Ann W. Lockridge, Abolishing State Trademark Registrations, 29 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 597, 605 (2011); see also B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 135 S. Ct.
1293, 1300 (2015); Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1985)
(listing advantages of federal trademark registration, including constructive notice of a
registrant’s ownership claim over a mark, a markholder’s exclusive right to use the registered
mark, and a trademark’s incontestability after a five-year period).
77. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1340.
78. Id. at 1345.
79. Id. at 1348.
80. Id. at 1346.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1347.
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permits, copyright registration certificates, or hunting licenses. 83 The
court further reasoned that even if the PTO had granted trademark
registration to THE SLANTS, the general public would likely not have
interpreted the registration as the government’s endorsement of the
band. 84
Strict scrutiny also applies because trademark registration does not
amount to a government subsidy. 85 According to the court, the
government does not send a message of any kind to the public when it
approves registration of a trademark. 86 “[T]he Lanham Act derives
from the Commerce Clause, not the Spending Clause,” 87 because it does
not confer any direct monetary benefits to registrants. 88 Taxpayers do
not fund trademark registration. 89 Instead, markholders’ “registration
fees cover all of the operating expenses associated with registering
marks.”90
The court concluded that because section 2(a)’s disparagement
provision does not pass strict scrutiny, it is unconstitutional under the
First Amendment.91 The majority acknowledged that its decision “may
lead to the wider registration of marks that offend vulnerable
communities.”92 It noted, however, that allowing for and “tolerat[ing]

83. Id. at 1347–48.
84. Id. at 1347.
85. Id. at 1348-49.
86. Id. at 1351.
87. Id. at 1354.
88. Id. at 1353.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1358.
92. Id. at 1357–58.
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insulting and . . . outrageous speech”93 is crucial to preserving “the
freedoms protected by the First Amendment.” 94
D. The Alternative Response to Constitutionality:
Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc.
In their fight for trademark registration, The Slants found an
unlikely and controversial ally in an NFL football team: the Washington
Redskins. Although the Redskins have owned their trademarks for
decades, the team’s battle with the PTO began around the same time as
The Slants.’ Their stories are interwoven.
The Redskins first registered the Redskins trademarks in 1967. 95
Almost fifty years later, in June 2014, the TTAB cancelled the team’s
trademarks under the section 2(a) disparagement ban in Pro-Football,
Inc. v. Blackhorse.96 The TTAB reasoned that “at the time of their
registrations[,] the marks consisted of matter that both ‘may disparage’
a substantial composite of Native Americans and bring them into
contempt or disrepute.”97 Over the years, in addition to using the term
“redskins,” “the team has consistently associated itself with Native
American imagery.”98 It has used logos of a Native American man and
spears, Native American headdresses, traditional Native American
clothing, and black braided-hair wigs for the team’s marching band and
cheerleaders.99

93. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988).
94. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011).
95. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 448 (E.D. Va. 2015).
96. Pro-Football, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 451. Note, however, that “the cancellation of
the Redskins trademark has never gone into effect. Under federal law, that only happens after the
Redskins unsuccessfully exhaust all of their appeals. As a consequence, the Redskins have
maintained all of the benefits of federal trademark registration during the controversy.” Michael
McCann, Why the Redskins Scored a Victory in the Supreme Court’s Ruling in Favor of The
Slants, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jun. 19, 2017), https://www.si.com/nfl/2017/06/19/washingtonredskins-name-slants-trademark-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/Q2AE-M7D2].
97. Pro-Football, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 451 (citation omitted).
98. Id. at 469–70.
99. Id.

BEHNAM

16

3/22/2018 8:00 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

In July 2015, the Eastern District Court of Virginia affirmed the
TTAB’s decision in Pro-Football and upheld the constitutionality of the
Lanham Act’s disparagement ban. 100 Months later, the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion in In re Tam.101
Following its defeat in the Eastern District Court of Virgina, respondent
Pro-Football appealed and asked the Fourth Circuit to postpone oral
argument until after the Supreme Court delivered its decision in Lee v.
Tam.102 Between the In re Tam decision and the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Matal v. Tam (formerly Lee v. Tam), “[t]he PTO . . . halted the
processing of all trademark applications raising disparagement issues,
including Tam’s.”103
E. The Supreme Court Weighs in on Disparagement, Once and for All
On September 29, 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Lee v. Shiao Tam;104 its eight members heard oral arguments on the
matter on January 18, 2017.105 In a June 19, 2017, plurality opinion, the
Court unanimously struck down the Lanham Act’s disparagement
clause as unconstitutional.106

100. Id. at 465.
101. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1328.
102. Joanna Diakos & Thomas W. Dollar, Trademark Law Update: SCOTUS to Decide
Whether Ban on Registering ‘Disparaging Marks’ Is Unconstitutional, NAT’L L.J. REV. (Nov. 8,
2016),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/trademark-law-update-scotus-to-decide-whetherban-registering-disparaging-marks [https://perma.cc/MU69-3ERY]; see also Brief for ProFootball, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 3, Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016)
(No. 15-1293).
103. Band Front Man Asks U.S. High Court to Consider Trademark Disparagement, 1711 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. TRADEMARKS (2016).
104. Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016), cert. granted, (No. 174, 2016 Term).
105. Oral Argument, Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016) (No. 15-1293),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2016/15-1293 [https://perma.cc/Q49XA9SU]; see also Marcia Coyle & Tony Mauro, Gorsuch’s SCOTUS Vote Could Soon Prove
Decisive on Many Cases; Senate Confirms Gorsuch 54–45 to Fill Scalia Vacancy, NAT’L L.J.
R EV. (Apr. 7, 2017), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202783207725/Gorsuchs SCOTUS-Vote-Could-Soon-Prove-Decisive-on-Many-Cases?slreturn=20170906141452
[https://perma.cc/4LX9-SRUN].
106. See generally Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Breyer and Kennedy joined Justice Alito’s opinion, while Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor,
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First, the Court held that “the disparagement clause applies to
marks that disparage the members of a racial or ethnic group,” and not
merely to natural or juristic persons as Tam had initially contended. 107
In affirming the Federal Circuit’s determination that the disparagement
clause violates the First Amendment, the Court held that trademarks are
private speech and not a form of government speech, subsidy, or
program.108
In finding that trademarks do not constitute government speech,
the Court noted that the federal government neither creates nor edits
registered trademarks. 109 It reasoned that if trademarks were in fact
government speech, then the federal government would be “babbling
prodigiously and incoherently,” saying “unseemly things,” “expressing
contradictory views,” and “endorsing a vast array of commercial
products and services.”110
Moreover, the Court noted that none of its previous decisions
involving government speech contended that trademarks are a form of
government speech.111 Trademarks are unlike monuments, for instance,
which governments have used “to speak to the public since ancient
times.”112 And private speech cannot be “passed off as government
speech by simply affixing a government seal of approval”; if the
government were allowed to do so, it would have free rein to “silence or
muffle the expression of disfavored viewpoints.”113

and Kagan joined Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. This article’s analysis of that case focuses on
Justice Alito’s opinion.
107. Id. at 1757.
108. Id. at 1757–64.
109. Id. at 1758.
110. Id. at 1758–59 (asking rhetorically: “If trademarks represent government speech,
what does the Government have in mind when it advises Americans to ‘make.believe’ (Sony),
‘Think different’ (Apple), ‘Just do it’ (Nike), or ‘Have it your way’ (Burger King)? Was the
Government warning about a coming disaster when it registered the mark ‘EndTime
Ministries’?”) (internal footnotes omitted).
111. Id. at 1759.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1758..
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Next, the Court determined that trademark registration does not
equate to a government subsidy. 114 “The PTO does not pay money to
parties seeking registration of a mark,” but rather, the applicant pays the
PTO an initial registration fee plus additional fees to maintain its mark
over time. 115 The use of government funds in examining and publishing
marks does not mean that trademark registration is therefore a
government subsidy, as “just about every government service requires
the expenditure of government funds.”116
The Court also refuted the government’s attempt to retain the
disparagement clause as a type of government program. 117 Though
“some content- and speaker-based restrictions may be allowed” “[w]hen
government creates . . . a forum, in either a literal or ‘metaphysical’
sense,” viewpoint discrimination, such as that found under section
2(a)’s disparagement clause, is still forbidden. 118 Thus, the Court
reaffirmed the long-standing rule that “‘the public expression of ideas
may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves
offensive to some of their hearers.’”119
Finally, the Court held that the disparagement clause “cannot
withstand even Central Hudson review.” 120 In other words, the Lanham
Act’s restrictions on disparaging trademarks do not serve a substantial
interest and are not narrowly drawn. 121 Although the government
argued “an interest in preventing ‘underrepresented groups’ from being
114. Id. at 1761 (dismissing as inapplicable the notion that “government is not required to
subsidize activities that it does not wish to promote”).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1763.
119. Id. (citing Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)).
120. Id. at 1764. The government also argued an interest in “protecting the orderly flow
of commerce.” Id. In rejecting this argument, the Court noted that “the disparagement clause is
not ‘narrowly drawn’ to drive out trademarks that support invidious discrimination.” Id. at 1764–
65. Instead, “[t]he clause reaches any trademark that disparages any person, group, or
institution.” Id. at 1765. Thus, “[i]t is not an anti-discrimination clause; it is a happy-talk clause”
that “goes much further than is necessary to serve the interest asserted.” Id.
121. Id. at 1764.
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‘bombarded with demeaning messages in commercial advertising,” the
Court stressed that one of the government’s most critical responsibilities
is to protect the First Amendment. 122 “Speech that demeans on the basis
of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar
ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech
jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that
we hate.’”123
IV. LOOKING TO THE P AST AND THE FUTURE: EXAMINING THE PTO’S
MISSTEPS AND EXPLORINJG WHAT MATAL V. TAM SIGNIFIES FOR SECTION
2(A) OF THE LANHAM ACT
Although section 2(a)’s language has yet to be updated, in the
wake of Matal v. Tam, the PTO may no longer refuse trademark
registration solely because it deems a mark disparaging. 124
Nevertheless, the Matal v. Tam decision was limited to section 2(a)’s
ban on disparaging marks; it did not address section 2(a)’s remaining
provisions, including its ban on immoral and scandalous marks. 125
Given the Court’s narrow ruling, the question now is whether these
provisions will also be deemed unconstitutional.
We may have the answer before long. In 2011, streetwear fashion
designer Erik Brunetti attempted to trademark the term FUCT for his
company Fuct Manufacturing Co. 126 The PTO denied Brunetti’s
application because it contained “‘vulgar, profane and scandalous
slang’” (i.e., an immoral and scandalous mark), and the TTAB affirmed
that decision in August 2014.127 “Brunetti appealed to the Federal
Circuit, arguing that the Lanham Act’s prohibition on scandalous marks
violates the First Amendment,” but “[t]he court stayed the case while
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See Patrick H.J. Hughes, PTO Updates Trademark Examiners’ Guide to Reflect
‘Slants’ Decision, Westlaw Intellectual Prop. Daily Briefing, June 29, 2017, at 1, 2017 WL
2804035 (summarizing how the PTO plans to comply with the Matal Court’s decision).).
125. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017).
126. In re Brunetti, 2014 WL 3976439, at *1–2 (T.T.A.B. 2014).
127. Id. at *1, *3 (reasoning that “the term ‘Fuct’ is the phonetic equivalent of the word
‘Fucked,’ the past tense form of the verb ‘fuck’”).
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the Supreme Court heard Matal v. Tam.”128 Following the Matal
holding, the Federal Circuit ordered the In re Brunetti parties to submit
supplemental briefs “explaining how the constitutionality of the
immoral and scandalous provision should be resolved in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision.”129
In striking down section 2(a)’s disparagement clause as
unconstitutional, the Matal Court upheld the spirit of the First
Amendment, invalidated an arbitrarily applied ban, and supported
trademark registration’s underlying policy. 130 With In re Brunetti, the
Federal Circuit Court has the opportunity to do the same. 131 This
section explores the negative impact section 2(a) had on the Lanham
Act’s clarity, efficacy, and goals prior to Matal v. Tam, why allowing
trademark registration of disparaging, immoral, and scandalous marks
will likely not create a sudden influx of those marks, and how Matal v.
Tam may affect section 2(a)’s ban on immoral and scandalous marks in
the near future.
A. Section 2(a)’s Vagueness Creates Uncertainty for
Markholders and Consumers.
An examination of section 2(a) reveals a statute that is
inconsistent, unpredictable, and contradictory. Section 2(a)’s vague
nature allows the PTO’s trademark examiners to subjectively determine
whether an applicant’s marks are disparaging. In the United States,
vague laws are prohibited for two reasons: First, “regulated parties
should know what is required of them so they may act accordingly.”132
Second, “precision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing
the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way.”133 Yet, a close
128. Jan Wolfe, Court Likely to Lift Ban on Vulgar Trademarks After ‘Slants’ Ruling, 24
WESTLAW J. INTELLECTUAL PROP. 1, 8 (2017).
129. Jennifer Ko Craft, Why High Court Is Right About Offensive Trademarks, LAW 360
(June 28, 2017, 5:18 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/939421/why-high-court-is-rightabout-offensive-trademarks [https://perma.cc/GG4R-DLLZ].
130. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1744.
131. See generally In re Brunetti, 2014 WL 3976439.
132. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012).
133. Id.
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examination of the PTO’s track record reveals that the office had no
history of uniformly registering or rejecting similar marks. 134 To the
contrary, “[t]he PTO often decides, in [a] contradictory manner, whose
speech gets the ‘privilege’ of a registered trademark . . . [a]nd whose
doesn’t.”135 For instance, looking at generally similar marks, the PTO
granted registration for the trademark JIHAD WATCH, but refused
registration for the trademark JEW WATCH; granted registration for
the trademark EVILCHRISTIANS, but denied registration for the mark
STOP ISLAMISATION OF AMERICA; and accepted the mark THE
DEVIL IS A DEMOCRAT, while rejecting the mark HAVE YOU
HEARD SATAN IS A REPUBLICAN. 136
Even more egregiously, the PTO often treated “identical terms
differently.”137 For instance, “[t]he PTO has registered FAGDOG on
some occasions, and on other occasions has found FAGDOG
disparaging.”138 And, although it denied the mark HEEB under section
2(a) for being disparaging toward Jews, HEBE, the alternative spelling
of the word, is registered.139
Most relevant to the PTO’s prior rejection of THE SLANTS are
the marks that have been registered to other bands that bear terms
offensive based on race and gender. In the past, the PTO has registered
the trademark WHITE TRASH COWBOYS for an all-white rock band
as well as N.W.A., an abbreviation for “Niggaz With Attitude,” for an
all-black rap group.140 The PTO’s inconsistent approach to evaluating

134. Michael Baroni, Warning: Offensive Trademarks Lie Ahead, OC LAWYER,
http://www.virtualonlineeditions.com/article/Warning%3A+Offensive+Trademarks+Lie+Ahead/
2499689/0/article.html [https://perma.cc/JR33-Q879].
135. Id.
136. Id.; see generally In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Brief for Respondent
at 54 Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016) (No. 15-1293).).
137. Brief for Pro-Football, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 13, Lee v.
Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016) (No. 15-1293).
138. Brief for Respondent, supra note 136, at 54.
139. Emily M. Kustina, Comment, Discriminatory Discretion: PTO Procedures and
Viewpoint Discrimination under Section 2(A) of the Lanham Act, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 513, 527
(2016).
140. Brief for Pro-Football, Inc., supra note 137, at 10.
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disparaging marks continued even amidst its litigation with Tam; after
the PTO rejected THE SLANTS, it registered the mark REFORMED
WHORES to a female comedy band. 141
As discussed in Section II, supra, prior to Matal, PTO trademark
examiners were instructed to ask two questions when determining
whether a registrant’s mark was disparaging: “(1) What is the likely
meaning of the matter in question, . . . and (2) if that meaning is found
to refer to identifiable persons, institutions, beliefs or national symbols,
whether that meaning may be disparaging to a substantial composite of
the referenced group.”142 This two-prong test provided little guidance
on how to determine whether a mark was disparaging. As a result, the
PTO’s trademark examiners granted and denied registration based on
their “subjective whims.”143 Although trademark examiners were meant
to exercise a policy of deference toward applicants in determining
section 2(a) compliance, 144 “analysis of the actual procedures
undertaken by examiners reveals that deference [was] employed in
name only, with examiners substituting their own discretionary
judgment of . . . disparagement for that of the public or disparaged
group.”145
The subjective test the PTO used was not limited to a trademark
examiner’s literal evaluation of a mark. In making their decisions, the
PTO’s trademark examiners often looked beyond the potentially
disparaging term and paid careful attention to the registrant’s identity
and his or her purpose for using the mark. 146 For example, a non-profit,
141. Id.
142. Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure, U.S. PATENT AND T RADEMARK
OFFICE § 1203.03(b)(i), https://www.uspto.gov/trademark/guides-and-manuals/tmep-archives
(click on “January 2015” under “TMEP—Archived Editions”) [https://perma.cc/2NBD-W8XB].
143. Baroni, supra note 134.
144. Kustina, supra note 139, at 519 (explaining that “[a]ccording to the TTAB and the
courts, the PTO is supposed to resolve any doubts as to the disparaging or scandalous nature of a
mark in favor of the applicant and then allow for opposition proceedings to assess any section
2(a) issues before the mark is registered on the Principal Register”).
145. Id. at 520.
146. See, e.g., In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Joe Garofoli,
Attorneys Find Dykes on Bikes Patently Offensive, Reject Name, S.F. GATE (July 14, 2005, 4:00
AM), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/joegarofoli/article/Attorneys-find-Dykes-on-Bikes-patentlyoffensive-2655626.php [https://perma.cc/JR33-Q879].
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pro-LGBT group was repeatedly refused registration of its trademark
DYKES ON BIKES until the markholder could show that “the term was
often enough used with pride” among the LGBT community. 147 “Thus,
an applicant [could] register a mark if he shows it is perceived by the
referenced group in a positive way, even if the mark contains language
that would be offensive in another context.”148 Not only was this
confusing, it was also illogical: the referenced group’s positive
perception of a mark does not eliminate its disparaging history.
This dependency on the trademark examiner’s understanding of
words or phrases for which registration was sought left markholders
vulnerable at the time of registration and beyond. Without a readily
identifiable and predictable standard, applicants with a potentially
disparaging mark had no way of knowing whether their mark would
pass the PTO’s subjective and varied standards. 149 Additionally, the
conflicting applications of section 2(a)’s provision reveal that the PTO
was not merely considering the words, phrases, or images used; it was
also considering who the markholder was, what the mark was
representing, and how society perceived the mark at the time of
application. 150
Moreover, under that system, a markholder with a potentially
disparaging mark could never feel fully secure in his or her trademark
registration. 151 “Even if an applicant obtain[ed] a registration initially,
the mark [could] be challenged in a cancellation proceeding years
later.”152 This is precisely what occurred in Pro-Football, where the
team registered (and renewed) six Redskins-related marks between the
years 1967 and 1990, only to have the TTAB cancel those registrations
in 2014.153 “Thus, after years of investment in promoting a registered
147. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1337; see generally Garofoli, supra, note 146.
148. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1337.
149. Id. at 1342–43.
150. Lisa P. Ramsey, A Free Speech Right to Trademark Protection?, 106 TRADEMARK
REPORTER 797, 808 (2016); see also Baroni, supra note 134.
151. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1342–43.
152. Id.
153. Brief for Pro-Football, Inc., supra note 137, at 1.
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mark and coming to be known by it,” markholders, like the Redskins,
were perpetually at risk of their marks being cancelled. 154 The
cancellation of a mark years after registration exposed that mark to
extreme market vulnerability, 155 forcing “the mark’s owner to find a
new mark and make substantial new investments in educating the
public, . . . and . . . establishing recognition of the new mark.”156
Similar marks, like disparaging marks, have also been treated
differently under section 2(a)’s tests. For instance, although the PTO
published marks for TWATTY and TWATTYTRAX, the PTO later
rejected the mark TWATTYGIRL on immoral or scandalous
grounds. 157 “The trademark MILF has been approved 23 times, but
refused 20 times. Marks including each of the following have been both
approved and refused: ANAL, ASS, BITCH, COCK, POTHEAD,
SHIT, SLUT, WHORE.”158
Unlike with disparaging and similar marks, the PTO has applied its
standard for denying scandalous and immoral marks fairly consistently.
The PTO’s determination of which marks are scandalous or immoral,
like with disparaging marks, “is largely subjective because of a lack of
defined legislative intent and the PTO’s failure to specifically articulate
standards for applying these bars to registration.” 159 As mentioned in
Section II, supra, to prove that a mark is scandalous,
the PTO must demonstrate that the mark is “shocking to the sense
of truth, decency, or propriety; disgraceful; offensive; disreputable;
. . . giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings; . . . [or]

154. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1343.
155. See Michelle B. Lee, Section 2(A) of the Lanham Act as a Restriction on Sports
Team Names: Has Political Correctness Gone too Far?, 4 SPORTS L.J. 65, 68–69 (1997)
(explaining that “individuals who argue for the cancellation of the registration of team names
have said they want the registrations canceled so that the value of the trademarks will be so
dramatically reduced that the owners will voluntarily cancel the marks”).
156. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1342–43.
157. In re Ava Watkins, 2005 WL 548042, at *1 (T.T.A.B. 2005); Kustina, supra note
139, at 521.
158. Brief for Erik Brunetti as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff, Lee v. Tam, 137 S.
Ct. 30 (2016) (No. 15-1293).
159. Kustina, supra note 139, at 516.
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calling out [for] condemnation.” The PTO must consider the mark
in the context of the marketplace as applied to only the goods
described in [the] application for registration.160

Yet, here the PTO has applied this standard consistently: “In the
scandalousness context, the most ‘vulgar’ words were denied
registration most frequently and most consistently.”161 Terms like
“‘[f]uck’ and ‘asshole’ received no registrations whatsoever, and . . .
[v]ery few marks using ‘shit’ were granted.” 162
One explanation for these varied outcomes may be that trademark
examiners find it easier to collect evidence of scandalousness than of
disparagement. “For scandalousness, most examiners rely on dictionary
definitions that deem the word to be offensive, vulgar, profane, or
scandalous to support a section 2(a) determination.” 163
For
disparagement, however, dictionary definitions and internet searches are
considered “lower-quality, less-reliable information” and “the PTO
lacks the resources to assemble high-quality evidence[—]such as
surveys, personal affidavits, petitions, and expert linguistic analysis[—
]to assess” the public’s actual perception. 164
B. Section 2(a) Conflicts with Basic First Amendment Rights.
The Supreme Court’s holding in Matal—that section 2(a)’s
disparagement clause is unconstitutional—is aligned with our national
interest in unimpeded freedom of speech. Although the government
does not always approve of messages conveyed in public debate, it
permits citizens to use deprecating and degrading language, if they so
choose, with little to no restrictions. 165 These permissions, referred to as
160. In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
161. Kustina, supra note 139, at 526.
162. Id. at 527.
163. Id. at 528.
164. Id. at 521.
165. See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that “[a]s a general
matter, the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it.
Speech that is called hateful, or speech that is unpopular, or speech with which you strongly
disagree, may still be protected speech. The Government, including the courts, can place
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on how protected speech may be expressed.
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the “breathing space” afforded by the First Amendment,166 illustrate the
government’s long-standing dedication “to protect[ing] even hurtful
speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.”167
It is well established that “speech cannot be restricted simply
because it is upsetting.”168 In Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court held
that the Westboro Baptist Church’s picketing of a soldier’s funeral with
hurtful signs and slogans was constitutionally protected speech. 169
Some of those signs, such as “Fag troops,” “God hates fags,” and “Fags
doom nations,” used the exact type of language prohibited under section
2(a)’s disparagement ban.170 Markholders who choose to use similarly
disparaging marks have now been granted the same protection in the
form of federal trademark registration, a protection that, logically,
should be extended to scandalous and immoral marks. The “few
categories of speech that the government can regulate or punish—for
instance, fraud, defamation, or incitement—are well established within
our constitutional tradition.”171 Scandalous and immoral marks, like
disparaging marks, do not fall into these categories. Trademarks, which
are created, promoted, and funded by the markholder, 172 should not
receive differential treatment simply because the PTO must approve
them prior to registration. Allowing federal registration of potentially
disparaging, scandalous, and immoral trademarks both protects and is
mandated by the First Amendment.

These restrictions must be narrowly tailored, and should balance the interests of all the people
involved”).
166. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988).
167. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460–61 (2011).
168. Id. at 458; see also Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 798 (2011)
(holding that “disgust is not a valid basis for restricting expression”).
169. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 463.
170. Id. at 448.
171. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1765.
172. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1353 (explaining that “since 1991 [PTO] appropriations have
been funded entirely by [trademark] registration fees, not the taxpayer”).
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C. Section 2(a) Contravenes Federal Trademark Law’s Objectives.
Section 2(a)’s ban on disparaging, immoral, and scandalous
trademarks also undermines the trademark system’s purpose. The
Lanham Act’s other restrictions support trademark protection’s public
policy; they limit markholders from registering marks likely to “cause
confusion . . . mistake . . . or to deceive,”173 as well as marks that are
“deceptively misdescriptive.”174 Viewed under a policy lens, section
2(a)—with its “hodgepodge of restrictions”—is out of place. 175 In fact,
section 2(a)’s restrictions directly conflict with Lanham Act’s
objectives. 176 By allowing the PTO to revoke a mark’s protection
whenever it deems it offensive, section 2(a) can be used to injure a
markholder after he or she “has invested millions of dollars protecting
its brand identity and consumers have come to rely on the mark as a
brand identifier.”177
By denying trademark protection to The Slants from December
2012 to June 2017, the Lanham Act imposed a heavy burden on the
band—it restricted Tam’s sole claim to the band name, as evidenced by
“other bands [that] have named themselves The Slants.”178 This hurt the
band in two ways: it negatively affected them financially, and it led to
consumer confusion.
First, other bands’ ability to freely name themselves “The Slants”
greatly restricted Tam’s financial earnings. 179
Without federal
trademark protection, Tam and his band could not fully benefit from the
mark they spent years cultivating. Instead, others using the mark
173. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2017).
174. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2017); In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1329.
175. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1329.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1330.
178. Ian Shapira, The Slants and the Redskins: ‘We Are Unlikely Allies,’ Band’s Founder
Says, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/the-slants-and-theredskins-we-are-unlikely-allies-the-bands-founder-says/2015/12/23/a16c3ce4-a9b8-11e5-9b92dea7cd4b1a4d_story.html [https://perma.cc/64T4-FU5W].
179. P. Sean Morris, The Economics of Distinctiveness: The Road to Monopolization in
Trade Mark Law, 33 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 321, 323 (2011).
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profited from Tam’s “sweat-of-the-brow,”180 contravening the Lanham
Act’s purpose and placing a financial burden on the markholder. 181 This
financial burden, itself a form of speech suppression182 and offensive to
the First Amendment, 183 is magnified by a markholder’s limited
protections under the common law. And “[w]ithout the recognition of
nationwide constructive use conferred by federal registration, a
competitor can swoop in and adopt the same mark for the same goods in
a different location.”184 Likewise, Tam and The Slants were also
prevented from stopping “importation of goods bearing [the band’s]
mark,” and could not “recover treble damages for willful
infringement.”185
Second, the lack of absolute trademark protection afforded to The
Slants prior to June 2017 led to consumer confusion. Congress created
the Lanham Act, in large part, to protect “the consuming public from
deception.”186 Yet, here the PTO’s refusal to register “The Slants”
caused consumer confusion and lead to public deception. For instance,
the existence of another band named The Slants resulted in fans
mistakenly buying concert tickets under the false impression that they
were going to see Tam’s band. 187 These mistakes were the direct result
of confusion and deception caused by section 2(a)’s disparagement
ban.188 Ultimately, the ban enabled the exact behavior it was designed

180. “Sweat of the Brow” is an intellectual property law doctrine that first appeared in
copyright cases. The “underlying notion” behind the term was “that copyright was a reward for
the hard work that went into compiling facts.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 352 (1991).
181. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946).
182. Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 106 (3d Cir. 2004).
183. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995).
184. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1343.
185. Id.
186. Lynda J. Oswald, Challenging the Registration of Scandalous and Disparaging
Marks Under the Lanham Act: Who Has Standing to Sue?, 41 AM. BUS. L. J. 251, 257 (2004).
187. Shapira, supra note 178.
188. Id.
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to deter: the misappropriation of Tam’s mark and the confusion and
deception of his fans.189
D. Eliminating Section 2(a) Will Not Create a Sudden Influx of
Disparaging, Scandalous, or Immoral Trademarks.
Proponents of section 2(a)’s disparagement provision maintained
that without the ban, the federal government would “affirmatively
promote the use of racial slurs and other disparaging terms.” 190
However, the Lanham Act’s previous blanket ban on disparaging,
scandalous, and immoral marks is not the only means for preventing
distasteful trademarks; other methods are available to minimize the
number of potentially disparaging and scandalous trademarks
registered.
Even after the Supreme Court struck down section 2(a)’s
disparagement ban as unconstitutional, the PTO still faces little danger
of bombardment by an influx of disparaging trademark applications.
While it is true that pre-existing disparaging marks can now receive
registration, and that many new marks that would have previously been
rejected as disparaging can now be registered, 191 the uncertainty and
concern over the effects of the Supreme Court’s holding is likely
unfounded. On a day-to day-basis, the average person faces a low
number of unregistered disparaging marks. 192 The United States, as a
nation, continues to be defined by its traditional and conservative
values.193 As a result, businesses and individuals have learned that it is
189. Id.
190. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (No. 15-1293) at *10.
191. Why You Should Give A $*%! about Words that Offend, NPR (May 13, 2013, 5:20
AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/05/13/180811135/why-you-should-give-a-about-words-thatoffend [https://perma.cc/VP6J-V59D].
192. In the United States, consumers can still find goods and services with immoral,
scandalous, or disparaging names. For instance, customers can get their doors trimmed at
Beaver’s Trim Shop in Texas, can purchase lumber from Dykes Lumber Company in New Jersey,
and hire a handyman through LP Coplete Hoe Repair in New York. Though perhaps not named in
good taste, names like these are scarce and carry a connection to the owner or the type of good or
service provided by the company. John Boitnott, 15 of the Worst Business Names in History,
INC. (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.inc.com/john-boitnott/15-of-the-worst-business-names-inhistory.html [https://perma.cc/3GFM-E5RD].
193. See generally The American-Western European Values Gap, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/11/17/the-american-western-european-
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generally good practice to lean toward neutral or positive
representations when selecting names, images, and sounds for their
marketed goods and services.194 Fear of unease, contempt, and even
boycott drives most markholders to shy away from selecting and
promoting negative and disparaging trademarks. 195 Matal v. Tam’s
effective removal of section 2(a)’s ban on disparaging trademarks is
unlikely to change this fundamental business practice.
By prohibiting the PTO from rejecting marks solely on the basis of
disparagement, the Court eliminated the government’s means of
“disapprov[ing] of the messages conveyed by disparaging marks.” 196
However, given our nation’s continued sensitivity to certain words and
images, 197 the court of public opinion will likely assume section 2(a)’s
previous role. Because consumers possess great purchasing power, they
can, in a sense, regulate the number of registered disparaging
trademarks used. 198 Even minority groups and those potentially
values-gap/ [https://perma.cc/6QGV-VY4U], (finding that Americans are more socially
conservative, religious, and less tolerant of homosexuality than European counterparts); SarahJane Stratford, Conservative Americans are more terrified of sex than violence, THE GUARDIAN
(Nov. 4, 2013, 1:18 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/04/blue-is-thewarmest-colour-shocking [https://perma.cc/TX8D-GYXM]; Why You Should Give A $*%! about
Words that Offend, supra note 191.
194. See generally Vince Bridgman, Why You Should Care about the Name You Give
Your Company, B P LANS , http://articles. bplans. com/w hen-company-names-go-bad/
[https://perma.cc/4PCN-S7KX]; Susan Ward, 5 Rules for Choosing a Business Name, BALANCE ,
https://www.thebalance.com/rules-for-choosing-a-business-name-2948575 (last updated Feb. 21,
2017) [https://perma.cc/Z6YZ-8R84]; Joanna Wiebe, How to Name a Product —Do This, Avoid
That, COPYHACKERS (July, 2012), https://copyhackers.com/2012/07/how-to-name-a-product
[https://perma.cc/W9Y8-8B2P]; Krystal Peak, Company names exposed: The good, the bad and
the truly awful, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/
blog/2011/11/whats-in-a-name-the-good-and-the-bad.html [https://perma.cc/2KL2-D4SZ] (discussing
branding expert Alexandra Watkins’ “12-point ‘Smile or Scratch’ test to help businesses test their
brands or product names—posing the question, ‘When you hear the company name does it make
you smile or scratch your head?’”).
195. See Bridgman, supra note 194; Wiebe, supra note 194.
196. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1327.
197. Why You Should Give A $*%! about Words that Offend, supra note 191 (asserting
that although the United States has become more accepting of some swear words over time, there
is always a category of swear words that remain off limits, and that today, this category includes
“the racial slurs and epithets that sum up people in some way”).
198. Power at Last, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 31, 2005), http://www.economist.com/node/
3810230 [https://perma.cc/PTV9-RMYT].
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disparaged by the terms possess this potent and influential power. 199
Offended groups can avoid, ignore, protest, or even boycott a registered
trademark deemed truly offensive. 200 Consumers can not only decline
to purchase goods or services associated with a mark deemed
disparaging, they can also make a conscious effort to purchase from a
competitor with a neutral or positive mark. 201 The potential for such
action incentivizes creators and owners of goods and services to steer
clear of names that may be deemed racist, sexist, homophobic,
xenophobic, bigoted, or offensive to other group identities.
A crucial illustration of this alternative to a section 2(a)
disparagement ban can be found in the Washington Redskins’ most
recent experience. As described above, the Washington Redskins’
football team has come under attack for its trademarked team name and
logo, marks which many find disparaging to Native Americans. 202
199. See generally Bridget Brennan, Top 10 Things Everyone Should Know about Women
Consumers, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bridgetbrennan/2015/01/21/
top-10-things-everyone-should-know-about-women-consumers/#2059dea8289 [https://perma.cc/
M9L9-EAGJ] (explaining that “[w]omen drive 70-80% of all consumer purchasing, through a
combination of their buying power and influence,” meaning that “even when a woman isn’t
paying for something herself, she is often the influence or veto vote behind someone else’s
purchase”); Janie Boschma, Black Consumers Have ‘Unprecedented Impact’ in 2015, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/black-consumers-haveunprecedented-impact-in-2015/433725/ [https://perma.cc/63NV-HE9Q]; Jeff Green, LGBT
Purchasing Power Near $1 Trillion Rivals Other Minorities in 2015, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 20, 2016,
10:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-20/lgbt-purchasing-power-near-1trillion-rivals-other-minorities [https://perma.cc/GA8T-98ZT] (explaining that in 2015, “[t]he
combined buying power of U.S. lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender adults rose . . . to $917
billion”); Nielsen: Asian-American Buying Power Increased by More than $50 Billion in One
Year—Expected to Hit $1 Trillion by 2018, NIELSEN (Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.nielsen.
com/ma/en/press-room/2015/nielsen-asian-american-buying-power-increased-by-more-than-50Bin-one-year.html [https://perma.cc/JWY4-7XMB], (explaining that in 2014, “Asian-American
buying power increased 7% from $718 billion to $770 billion . . . and continues to rise”).
200. 1-3 ANNE GILSON L ALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 3.04 (2017) (noting that
“if a mark were truly offensive to a substantial portion of the public, consumers would refuse to
buy the associated goods or services, which could effectively “remov[e] the mark from the
marketplace”).
201. In the past, courts have proposed leaving consumer behavior-related choices to the
marketplace. For instance, in Basile v. H&R Block, Inc., 563 Pa. 359, 371 (2000), the court was
asked to determine whether tax preparation company H&R Block violated agency law through
deceitful business practices. Although the court failed to find an agency relationship, it opined
that “[i]f Block’s method of doing business is worthy of the condemnation that appellees suggest,
presumably the marketplace will react to correct it.”
202. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 482 (E.D. Va. 2015); Angela
R. Riley & Kristen A. Carpenter, Owning Red: A Theory of Indian (Cultural) Appropriation, 94

BEHNAM

32

3/22/2018 8:00 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

Despite the backlash against the mark’s use, team owner Daniel Snyder
decided to keep the Redskins’ name and logo as is. 203 His refusal to
heed public opinion seems to have cost the team. Because Snyder
refused to change the team’s marks to something less offensive to
Native Americans, the team has been prevented from becoming “a
national powerhouse like the Cowboys.” 204 More obviously, the
Redskins’ devotion to its disparaging trademark has hurt its financial
growth potential. 205 In mid-2014, at the height of the Redskins
controversy, Redskins merchandise sales were down 35%, even though
overall NFL merchandise sales were up 3%. 206 And even now that the
Redskins’ trademark was deemed constitutional, consumers show no
signs of letting up. As recently as August 2017, Kirk Cousins was the
only Redskins player to make the Top 50 Player Sales List (based on
overall sales of all licensed products).207 Perhaps a change to a less
controversial name would increase ticket and merchandise sales and
restore the team’s positive perception lost as a result of its trademark
dispute and subsequent litigation. 208
TEX. L. REV. 859, 911 (2016); Peter Keating, Washington Has Everything to Lose, ESPN (Sept. 2,
2014), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/11419303/washington-redskins-losing-money-keeping
-name [https://perma.cc/3HPP-KGGK].
203. Keating, supra note 202.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Chris Isidore, Redskins Gear Stiff-Armed by Fans, CNN MONEY (Sept. 4, 2014, 3:57
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/09/04/news/companies/redskins-merchandise/ [https://perma.cc
/QE98-J9NH];
see also Ryan Wilson, Report: Redskins Merchandise Sales Dropped Sharply in Last Year, CBS
SPORTS (Sep. 7, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/report-redskins-merchandise-salesdropped-sharply-in-last-year/ [https://archive.is/oqAYz] (reporting that Redskins sales were
poorer than many teams who failed to make the playoffs in 2014, and that “[n]o NFL team has
seen a sharper drop in year-over-year merchandise sales in the past year than the Redskins”)).
207. Scott Allen, Four Cowboys, Plus Colin Kaepernick, Rank ahead of Any Redskins in
Merchandise Sales, WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dcsports-bog/wp/2017/08/01/four-cowboys-plus-colin-kaepernick-rank-ahead-of-any-redskins-inmerchandise-sales/?utm_term=.2027ff22f257 [https://perma.cc/WR8L-BQ68 ]. It is worth noting
that even Colin Kaepernick, the NFL player who caused controversy by refusing to stand for the
National Anthem, ranked over ten spots higher than Kirk Cousins on the Top 50 list. Id.
208. Or perhaps the Redskins can learn from Florida State University’s approach to using
the Native American Seminole as their school mascot: “For almost 70 years, Florida State has
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In addition to dealing financial blows to markholders with
disparaging marks, consumers can—and do—use their voices to speak
out against the use of such trademarks. For example, in recent years,
popular protests against, and growing distaste for, the Redskins has lead
sportscasters to avoid using the team’s name on television, prompted
newspapers to refuse to publish the name, 209 and even caused a
reduction in the team’s number of Twitter followers. 210
This form of consumer-based market regulation would even be
effective for marks like THE SLANTS, chosen to reclaim oncedisparaging language. If the negative language has truly regained
positive meaning amongst a substantial composite of the referenced
group, then the market will likely respond with neutrality or even
acceptance and buy-in. On the other hand, if the disparaging term has
not yet lost its offensive meaning or been repossessed by the targeted
group, that mark’s owner can likely expect the form of backlash
experienced by Snyder and the Washington Redskins, perhaps on a
smaller scale and stage.211
These same market concerns apply to markholders who choose to
select scandalous or immoral marks. In In re FOX, the Federal Circuit
affirmed a trademark examiner’s decision to reject registration of the
mark COCK SUCKER under grounds that the mark was scandalous.212
Although it is by no means a household name, this brand of roostershaped lollipops has existed since 1979.213 These lollipops are mostly
worked closely, side by side, with the Seminole Tribe of Florida in a relationship that is mutually
supportive and built on respect.” The University considers the Seminoles’ history and traditions
in representing the tribe during games and frequently consults the tribe to ensure accuracy and
authenticity. The University has received enthusiastic support from the Seminole Tribal Council,
a distinction Florida State takes seriously. Autumn A. Arnett, The Future of Native American
Imagery in Sports, ATLANTIC (Nov. 21, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/
2015/11/native-imagery-in-college-sports/417036/ [https://perma.cc/8W4J-R7CV].
209. Andrew Beaujon, Here’s a List of Outlets and Journalists Who Won’t Use the Name
‘Redskins’, POYNTER (June 19, 2014), http://www.poynter.org/2014/heres-a-list-of-outlets-andjournalists-who-wont-use-the-name-redskins/256258/ [https://perma.cc/KHV9-Q2HX].
210. Isidore, supra note 206.
211. Keating, supra note 202 (noting that in September 2014, the Washington Redskins
ranked “20th in the NFL with 319,000 Twitter devotees,” although “[t]he team should have [had]
roughly 60,000 more . . . which would place it 16th in the league”).
212. In re Fox, 702 F.3d 633, 634 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
213. Id. at 635.
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displayed in retail-outlets accessible “to fans of the University of South
Carolina and Jacksonville State University, both of which employ
gamecocks as their athletic mascots.”214 The lollipops may also serve as
an amusing gag gift or novelty: distributed as gifts at bachelorette
parties or shared between juvenile friends. 215
Its defining
characteristic—the name Cock Sucker—does the product’s success a
greater disservice than a neutral or positive name would. Although
children make up a large portion of the candy and lollipop market’s
target audience, they are not the target market here. Parents—who
supply children with their candy—are probably less likely to purchase
Cock Sucker-branded lollipops for their children over more
appropriately-named options like Tootsie Pops or Dum-Dums.
Government fear of losing control over the nation’s morality is
unfounded; the PTO was already less effective than consumer forces at
deterring the use of scandalous and immoral marks. For instance,
although Cock Sucker lollipops were denied trademark registration, Fox
could use the unregistered Cock Sucker mark. 216 A more effective
means of deterring the use of immoral, offensive, and vulgar content
would be for retail stores, en masse, to refuse to carry the offending
lollipops, for only “adult-themed” stores to purchase the lollipops, or for
shopkeepers to place the lollipops on a higher and less visible shelf.
The Fox court itself pointed out that if the plaintiff was “correct that the
mark at issue ‘bring[s] [nothing] more than perhaps a smile to the face
of the prospective purchaser, . . . then the market will no doubt reward
her ingenuity.”217 The market can—and often does—decide how much
exposure a product receives, how popular it will become, and how many
sales it will garner. In a nation generally hesitant to embrace scandalous
and vulgar images, terms, and products, finding great success with a
scandalous mark is a challenging feat, with or without PTO approval.
In his concurring opinion in Matal, Justice Kennedy wrote that
“[t]he First Amendment does not entrust” the power to protect the
public from offensive speech “to the government’s benevolence.
214. Id.
215. Similarly, in In re Brunetti the TTAB acknowledged that the scandalous mark at
issue in its case—’FUCT’—represents a “niche market,” one that is strong but small nevertheless.
In re Brunetti, 2014 WL 3976439, at *11.
216. In re Fox, 702 F.3d at 640.
217. Id. at 639.
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Instead, our reliance must be on the substantial safeguards of free and
open discussion in a democratic society.”218 Fear of low sales and bad
publicity will compel most trademark registrants to choose marks that
are less offensive or polarizing and more neutral, safe, and harmless.
This form of market-based trademark regulation is the type of safeguard
Justice Kennedy envisioned in Matal, a realistic compromise between
the government’s desire to protect consumers from disparaging,
scandalous, and immoral language and our nation’s dedication to
protecting its First Amendment rights.
E. Section 2(a)’s Future
Experts seem to believe that the Matal “decision will apply equally
to the section 2(a) bar for ‘immoral’ and ‘scandalous’ terms.”219
Significantly, following the Federal Circuit’s decision in Tam, the
government itself “conceded that the holding . . . requires the
invalidation of Section 2(a)’s prohibition against registering scandalous
and immoral marks as well.”220 “[W]hen the USPTO denies registration
to marks that it deems to be “immoral” or “scandalous,” it does so on
the basis that the government disapproves of the expressive message
conveyed in the mark.”221 Disapproval of a message, which was not
enough for the Matal Court, is unlikely to save the fate of section 2(a)’s
ban on scandalous or immoral marks in In re Brunetti.
Matal has already determined that trademarks are neither
government speech, nor a form of government subsidy, nor a type of
government program.222 If the government cannot silence a hateful
mark, it is unlikely it can silence a distasteful one. In finding section
2(a)’s disparagement clause unconstitutional, Matal was clear: “[T]he
government never can attempt to regulate speech based on its

218. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1769.
219. J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, §19:77
(5th ed., 2017).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1757–64.
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offensiveness.”223 Like the terms REDSKINS or SLANT, the term
FUCT is undoubtedly offensive to many. 224 The government, however,
should not be allowed to reject scandalous marks while barred from
rejecting disparaging ones. If Matal instructs us to protect the freedom
to express even hateful thoughts, 225 this directive should logically
include speech considered immoral or scandalous.
V. CONCLUSION
Scholars have hailed Matal as “the most important free speech
case of the year.”226 It is worth noting that because The Slants have
won, so have the Redskins. As Simon Tam and his band celebrate
finally being able to benefit from a trademark they assert is reclaiming a
derogatory term, so too do the Redskins regain their ability to profit
from their racially insensitive trademarks. Yet, our consumer-regulated
market dictates that this should not be a cause for concern. By
accepting certiorari for Tam over the Redskins, the Supreme Court
clearly chose the more sympathetic plaintiff. American consumers,
however, will likely not be as sympathetic to holders of disparaging
trademarks.
With Matal v. Tam, the Supreme Court altered the Lanham Act to
better align it with our changing societal standards and to conform with
the U.S. Constitution. The Federal Circuit now has an opportunity to
make the same great strides with In re Brunetti. Section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act is vague, creates uncertainties for trademark examiners and
markholders, impedes our First Amendment right to free speech, and
stands in stark conflict with the Lanham Act’s purpose and trademark
law’s principles. Denying trademark registration to disparaging,
scandalous, and immoral marks exposes markholders to financial harm,
while allowing others to reap where the original markholder has sown.
It also exposes consumers to possible confusion and deceit.
223. Erwin Chemerinsky, Waiting for Gorsuch October Term 2016, 20 Green Bag, 2d
351, 357 (2017); see also Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751 (holding that “[s]peech may not be banned on
the ground that it expresses ideas that offend”).
224. In re Brunetti, 2014 WL 3976439, at *5.
225. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1764.
226. Erwin Chemerinsky, Waiting for Gorsuch October Term 2016, 20 GREEN BAG 2d
351, 357 (2017).
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Eliminating section 2(a)’s ban on disparaging, scandalous, and
immoral marks is the best solution to the problems it currently presents.
And, a finding that these provisions of section 2(a) are unconstitutional
is unlikely to inundate the PTO with trademark applications for
disparaging marks. Rather, our consumer-driven market will continue
to ensure that controversial or derogatory products and services will
find less success than their counterparts.
Our nation is in a different place now than when Simon Tam first
began his legal battle. Recent events have displayed an uptick in racial,
political, and gender tensions and sensitivities, particularly in the wake
of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. 227 Despite this, Matal reaffirms
the notion that free speech must remain free, even if it is hateful.
In 2017, The Slants released their latest album, entitled “The Band
Who Must Not Be Named,” a play on their years spent in trademark
limbo while fighting for their right to federal trademark recognition.
After a long battle, The Slants have finally won their right to freedom of
expression; their efforts now afford many others that same right.

227. See Post-Election Spike in Hate Crimes Persists in 2017, PBS (Aug. 13, 2017),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/post-election-spike-hate-crimes-persists-2017/ [https://perma.cc
/UQE9-9UQX].

